Anne Emanuelle Birn Marriage of Convenience; Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico (2006)

[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.Persuaded to revolt by General S�nchezg'74 hooked on hookwormg'of Veracruz and other caudillos in Jalisco and Oaxaca, de la Huerta and his fol-lowers claimed that Obregón s army reforms were unfair, that his agrarian poli-cies were too radical, and that his maneuverings to ensure the election ofInterior Minister Plutarco El�as Calles constituted a fraudulent presidential suc-cession.De la Huerta named a provisional replacement for Veracruz GovernorTejeda, and fighting broke out around the state of Veracruz and along a widepath to Mexico City.S�nchez s forces, joined by federal troops stationed inVeracruz, rapidly captured the region s main cities, taking state and federal offi-cials by surprise.The rebels vainly sought the backing of at least some peasantforces; but the agrarian movement rallied to the support of Tejeda andObregón.58 The U.S.State Department was initially divided over whom to sup-port; only in January 1924, after Obregón employed threats and cajoling toobtain the Mexican Senate s ratification of the Bucareli Street agreements, didCoolidge organize a blockade at the oil port of Tampico to counter the rebelsand arm Obregón s forces.59With wire, steamer, and train service suspended, the IHB s men were stranded inVeracruz; fruit boats en route from Central America to the U.S.were the region sonly means of communication.Despite the danger and uncertainty, the IHB homeoffice remained optimistic, holding that its work was appreciated by both partiesto the controversy and that either of them would probably support the program. 60From the perspective of IHB officers in Mexico, however, it was politically pru-dent not to mention safer to delay the campaign s debut in Veracruz.IHByellow fever officer Vaughn was deeply troubled at the possibility that the RF saccomplishments could be lost.He explained to newcomer Warren: The Latin-American is suspicious of all foreigners and the Mexican, in particular, of hisnorthern neighbors. Thanks to the yellow fever campaign, I feel sure that noforeigners in Mexico ever achieved our standing in the eyes of the people andgovernment. Vaughn worried that the IHB s reputation was imperiled by themany U.S.citizens in Veracruz who were openly sympathizing with the de laHuertistas and because Juan López, a yellow fever Special Commissionemployee, was an active member of the rebel movement.As a result, Vaughnbelieved it would be natural for the Mexican government to become suspi-cious of our most innocent activities. 61Vaughn proposed that at least one IHB officer go to Mexico City for the remain-der of the crisis in order to stay in close contact with DSP officials.This plan wouldenable the RF to keep counsel with both the Obregón government and the de laHuertista rebels in Veracruz.If the opposition won, IHB programs were safe sincethe staff is all known personally to the revolutionary chiefs and has their confi-dence. If the federal government won and IHB representatives had neglectedrelations with Mexico City, Vaughn feared, President Obregón could:consider all Americans more or less persona non grata and this would materially inter-fere with the programme I have laid out.A distrust on the part of the Obregónhooked on hookworm 75government might eventually spread to Central America and impair a record built upafter years of untiring effort and an expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars.62Vaughn s plans were followed to the letter.The U.S.consul advised Warren toevacuate his family from Veracruz and relocate in Mexico City, traveling viaNew Orleans.On February 10, Carr and Vaughn also arrived in Mexico City.DSP officials, for their part, were embarrassed that the Veracruz unrest wasaffecting the campaign and distressed at the potential impact on the Mexico-RFrelationship.Pruneda gladly welcomed the officers to the capital, concernedthat the IHB might abandon the country altogether.63 The acting hookwormdirector, Brioso Vasconcelos, apologized to Russell for his country s turbulentpolitics, hoping it would not discourage the RF.Assuring that normality wouldreturn little by little, Brioso Vasconcelos used the occasion to make an unsuc-cessful petition for an increase in funds.64 (Several DSP men later rememberedthe problem with Veracruz as climatological rather than political.There is noevidence, however, that the rainy season impeded hookworm work in Veracruzat any time.65)De la Huerta s rebellion was put down by the end of January 1924, but tur-moil continued in Veracruz for many months.DSP and IHB officers watchedand waited from Mexico City, planning the campaign from afar.In March 1924,Brioso Vasconcelos who had expressed repeated skepticism of Mexico s needfor a hookworm campaign left to become head of fumigation and public bathsfor the DSP.The campaign s new director was Dr.Juan Solórzano Morf�n, pre-viously the chief quarantine officer for Veracruz, who had overseen the port santiplague efforts and had been extremely supportive of the yellow fever cam-paign.Solórzano Morf�n was one of the best regarded physicians in Mexico, abrilliant lecturer, committed to public health and scientific research, foundingeditor of the Revista M�dica Veracruzana (Veracruz Medical Journal) and a close asso-ciate of President Obregón s.66 The selection seemed astute.Solórzano Morf�nwas at once a technical man, an IHB fan, and politically connected both locallyand federally.Outgoing yellow fever officer Vaughn considered him ideal forMexico s hookworm campaign, probably one of the most important the IHBhas ever undertaken. 67The question of further hiring was made complicated by the Veracruz situa-tion.The IHB was concerned about filling high-level posts with persons whomight prove controversial pending political outcomes.There was certainly noshortage of interested parties.Soon after the inception of the hookworm cam-paign, Mexican doctors began making inquiries about obtaining jobs.Some evenwrote to the IHB s New York office, praising the success of the yellow fever meas-ures, lauding Rockefeller efforts around the world, and requesting positions withthe campaign.68 Over the short term, the IHB decided to maintain several of itsown experienced staff members in Mexico as a precautionary measure.Duringthis time the IHB also discouraged the hiring of Mexican physicians other thang'76 hooked on hookwormg'Disclaimer:Some images in the printed version of this bookare not available for inclusion in the eBook.To view the images on this page please refer tothe printed version of this book.Figure 2.5.Dr.Juan Solórzano Morf�n, hookworm campaign director(1924 26).From Gaceta M�dica de M�xico 58 (1927): 632.Reproduced by per-mission from the Gaceta M�dica de M�xico.those who had already proven themselves with the yellow fever campaign, initiallyemploying only lower-level assistants to work with the hookworm brigades.In April 1924, with hookworm staff trained and supplies ready, both theMexican government and the IHB home office pressured campaign officers tobegin action somewhere and soon.Yellow fever hand Vaughn worked closelywith Warren to relocate the campaign to the highland state of Tlaxcala.Monthsbefore the campaign started, Warren guessed that because Tlaxcala was verypoor, agricultural, and populated by pure-blooded Indians, There is everyreason to believe that hookworm infection is general in this state as the inhabi-tants still live in the most primitive manner [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

download - pobieranie - ebook - do ÂściÂągnięcia - pdf

Menu