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.Most often, Scott Charney, head of the Department of Justice's Computer Crime Unit, acted as chairman of this delegation.Also includedwere current and former members of the security establishment, such as Stewart Baker, formergeneral counsel of NSA (who at one point took minutes for the OECD Secretariat), and EdwardAppel of the National Security Council staff.With members representing the White House viewpoint,the US delegation pressed for adoption of key escrow.Initial reactions by the other delegates rangedfrom skepticism (the Japanese delegation wanted to know what would prevent criminals from usingtheir own cryptography systems see Baker 1997) to mild support for the US position (most notablyfrom the British delegation).In the economic-development setting of the OECD, key escrow was difficult to sell.Unlike lawenforcement, business has little need for real-time access to communications, encrypted or otherwise.Other nations did not see the issues as the United States did.The Danish government's InformationTechnology panel recommended that no limits be placed on a citizen's right to use encryption (ITSC1996).The Dutch delegate spoke in opposition (Rotenberg 1996, p.7).The Nordic countries arguedfor strong cryptography without trap doors.30 Meanwhile, German companies, taking advantage ofthe restrictions on their US competitors, were selling strong cryptography, and the Germangovernment had little interest in restricting such sales.31 Behind the scenes, and kept very much in thebackground, was Phil Reitinger, a member of the US Department of Justice Computer Crime Division,who was seconded to the OECD to write a draft policy.Yet even this influence was insufficient toconvince OECD member nations to support the US policy.In late March of 1997 the OECD issued its cryptography guidelines, which sidestepped key escrowand emphasized the importance of trust in cryptographic products ("Principle 1: Market forces shouldserve to build trust in reliable systems").The OECD recommended that cryptography be developedin response to the needs of "individuals, businesses, and [lastly] governments," and urged that "thedevelopment and provision of cryptographic methods should be determined by the market in an openand competitive environment, and that the development of international technical standards, criteriaand protocols for cryptographic methods should also be market driven" (OECD 1997).Despite theintense lobbying efforts by the Clinton administration, mandatory key escrow did not make it into theOECD's cryptography guidelines.Seven months later the European Commission dealt a further blow to the US position.In a policy paperon a European framework for digital signatures and encryption, the commission was cool to keyescrow.It observed that such schemes are easily circumvented and that the involvement of a third partyincreases the likelihood of message exposure (European Commission 1997, pp.16-17).TheCommission expressed concern about the difficulty of key escrow across national borders.The reportsaid that any such scheme should be limited to what is "absolutely necessary" (ibid., p.18) hardly theringing endorsement the US was seeking.The US Congress' ResponseCongress entered the fray in March of 1996 when Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the EncryptedCommunications Privacy Act of 1996 (S 1587), a compromise bill that allowed for a relaxation ofexport controls, affirmed the right to use any form of encryption domestically, created a legalframework for escrow agents, and criminalized the use of encryption in the furtherance of a crime. Less than a month later, Senator Conrad Burns proposed the more strongly pro-cryptographyPromotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (PRO-CODE) Act (S 1726).Burns's billprohibited mandatory key escrow, enshrined the freedom to sell and use any type of encryptiondomestically, and liberalized export rules.But 1996 was a presidential-election year, and the complexlegislation did not go forward.Burns reintroduced PRO-CODE in 1997 (S 377).In the House, Representative Bob Goodlatteproposed the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE) Act (HR 695).Under both bills,the freedom to sell and use any type of encryption would be unconstrained, and mandatory keyescrow would be prohibited [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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