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.The latter are more threatening largely because theclearing operation could take a considerable period and it would be difficultto know when you had cleared all of the mines.Tankers and their loads areworth about $170 million at current prices, and that uncertainty could causeowners to refuse the trip.Oil exports could fall dramatically, and the effecton the global economy  particularly now amid the global financial crisis could be absolutely devastating.Attacking Iran would be an air-sea battle,and could even include limited ground forces inserted to ensure that the nu-clear facilities were destroyed.The country most concerned with all of this is Israel.The Iranians hadgiven every indication that they plan to build a nuclear capability and use it182 against Israel.Israel s vulnerability to such a strike is enormous, and thereare serious questions about Israel s ability to use the threat of a counterstrikeas a deterrent to such a strike.In our view, Iran is merely creating a systemto guarantee regime survival, but given the tenor of Tehran s statements, Is-rael cannot afford to take this view complacently.Israel could unilaterally draw the United States into an airstrike on Iran.Were Israel to strike Iran by any means, it most likely would lack the abilityto conduct an extended air campaign.And the United States could not sufferthe consequences of airstrikes without the benefits of taking out Iran s nu-clear program.Apart from the political consequences, the US Navy would bedrawn into the suppression of Iranian naval capabilities in the Persian Gulfwhether it wanted to or not simply to keep the Strait of Hormuz open.Evenif Iran didn t act to close off the strait, Washington would have to assumethat it might, an eventuality it could not afford.So an Israeli attack wouldlikely draw in the United States against Iran one way or another.The UnitedStates has had no appetite for such an eventuality, particularly since it con-siders a deliverable Iranian nuclear weapon a ways off.The US alternative in both administrations  was diplomatic.III.Israel and Complications to the Diplomatic AlternativeWashington wanted to create a coalition of powers able to impose sanc-tions on Iran.At meetings over the summer, the Obama administration ap-pears to have promised Israel  crippling sanctions to prevent any unilateralIsrael action.At an April G-8 meeting, it was decided that Iran must engagein serious negotiations on its nuclear program prior to the next G-8 meeting on Sept.24  or face these sanctions.The crippling sanctions foreseen were some sort of interruption of theflow of gasoline into Iran, which imports 40 percent of its supply despite be-ing a net exporter of crude.Obviously, in order for this to work, all of the G-8 nations (and others) must participate, particularly Russia.Russia has thecapacity to produce and transport all of Iran s needs, not just its import re-quirements.If the Russians don t participate, there are no sanctions.The Russians announced weeks ago that they opposed new sanctions onIran and would not participate in them.Moreover, they seemed to flout theineffectiveness of any US sanctions.With that, the diplomatic option on Iranwas off the table.Russia is not eager to see Iran develop nuclear weapons,but it sees the United States as the greater threat at the moment.Moscow sfundamental fear is that the United States  and Israel  will dramaticallystrengthen Ukraine, Georgia and other states in the FSU and on its periphery,and that Russia s strategic goal of national security through pre-eminence inthe region will be lost.From the Russian point of view, the US desire for Russian help with Iranis incompatible with the US desire to pursue its own course in the FSU andcountries like Poland.From the US point of view, these were two entirelydifferent matters that should be handled in a different venue.But Washing-183 ton didn t get to choose in this matter.This was a Russian decision.TheRussians faced what they saw as an existential threat, believing that the USstrategy threatened the long-term survival of the Russian Federation.TheRussians were not prepared to support a US solution for Iran without Ameri-can support on Russian concerns.The Americans ultimately did not under-stand that the Russians had shifted out of the era in which the United Statescould simply dictate to them.Now, the United States had to negotiate withthe Russians on terms Moscow set, or the United States would have to be-come more directly threatening to Russia.Becoming more threatening wasnot an option with US forces scattered all over the Middle East.Therefore,the United States had to decide what it wanted.American attention in the run-up to the Oct.1 talks with Iran was focusedby Israel.The Obama administration had adopted an interesting two-tier po-sition on Israel.On the one hand, it was confronting Israel on halting settle-ment activity in the West Bank; on the other hand, it was making promises toIsrael on Iran.The sense in Israel was that the Obama administration was al-tering Washington s traditional support for Israel.Since Iran was a criticalthreat to Israel, and since Israel might not have a better chance to strike thannow, the Obama administration began to realize that its diplomatic optionhad failed, and that the decision on war and peace with Iran was not in itshands but in Israel s, since Israel was prepared to act unilaterally and drawthe United States into a war.Given that the Obama diplomatic initiative hadfailed and that the administration s pressure on Israel had created a sense ofisolation in Israel, the situation could now well spiral out of control.Although all of these things operated in different bureaucratic silos inWashington, and participants in each silo could suffer under the illusion thatthe issues were unrelated, the matters converged hurriedly last week [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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